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The paper examines the concept of social rights from both the analytical and philosophi-
cal perspective. In the first part of the paper a distinction is made between social rights 
in the strict sense (called in the paper “Type 1 social rights”), which can be decomposed 
into the Hohfeldian incidents, and social rights which resemble norm-goals and there-
fore cannot be decomposed into the Hohfeldian incidents (these rights are called in the 
paper “Type 2 social rights”). It is argued that even though Type 1 social rights are rights 
in the strict sense, they exhibit certain idiosyncrasies distinguishing them from “clas-
sical” rights, among which the most striking idiosyncrasy is their double correlation 
to duties. The second, philosophical part presents various ways in which social rights 
can be justified. A special emphasis is laid on the justification appealing to the concept 
of autonomy. Some standard criticisms of social rights are also evaluated.
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1. The ambiguity of the concept of social rights
In legal-philosophical discourse the term “social rights” is used to describe a set of rights 
such as, e.g., the right to social security, education, health, housing, which are to protect 
certain interests of agents that can be called “social”, or more precisely: “socio-econom-
ic”. This is the reason why the usage of the generic term “social rights” is not misplaced. 
But there is also a danger of misunderstanding in using this term, because particular 
“social rights” differ essentially in their structure, which justifies dividing this generic 
term into two more specific sub-terms, viz. “Type 1 social rights” and “Type 2 social 
rights”. The former can properly be called “rights”, since they can be easily decomposed 
into “Hohfeldian incidents”, whereas the latter cannot be thus decomposed: they re-
semble more the norm-goals than rights in the strict sense. However, this difference in 
structure is not correlated with a difference in their philosophical underpinnings, that 
is: one cannot say that the justification of Type 1 social rights is stronger than that of 
Type 2 social rights, or vice versa. The strength of justification must, in fact, be evaluated 
with respect to the content of a given right, not to its structure.
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The layout of this paper is as follows. In section 2 I shall deal with the differences 
in structure between both types of social rights. In section 3 I tackle the problem of the 
justification of social rights; in that section I shall also introduce a distinction between 
conditional social rights and unconditional social rights.
2. Type 1 and Type 2 social rights: differences in their structure
2.1. Type 1 social rights
Type 1 social rights include, among others, some of workers’ rights (to associate in trade 
unions,1 to limited hours of work, to paid leave, to higher wages for extra work, to ma-
ternity leave, to minimum pay, to decent working conditions), the right to unemploy-
ment benefits, the right to free public primary education,2 the right to basic healthcare, 
the right to the means of subsistence for the least advantaged, and the right to social 
security (including the rights to pension, disability, sickness, and survivors benefits). 
As mentioned, Type 1 social rights can be shown to be composed of “Hohfeldian inci-
dents” – liberties, claim-rights, or immunities. As we shall see, however, some of these 
rights assume a different form from that taken by these “Hohfeldian incidents”. But 
this does not alter the fact that, like civil and political rights, Type 1 social rights of can be 
properly called “rights” and belong to the domain of the judiciary, i.e., they can be enforced 
by recourse to court procedures.
Before moving on to the presentation of the main categories of Type 1 social rights 
let me first recall the definitions of ‘Hohfeldian incidents’:3
– (Liberty) An agent A has a liberty (privilege) to do x if and only if A has no duty 
to do x or non-x; A’s liberty is therefore correlated with “no-right” on the part 
of other persons, who have the duty of non-interference.
– (Claim-right) An agent A has a claim-right that B do x if and only if B has a duty 
to do x. Thus, every claim-right correlates to a duty on the part of one or more 
duty-bearers. B’s duty may consist either in performing some action or in re-
fraining from performing some action; in the latter case the duty-bearers are all 
persons. Claim-rights are therefore of two types: in personam – correlated with 
specific duties of specific individuals, and in rem – held not against some specific 
nameable persons but against the world at large.
– (Power) An agent A has a power if and only if A has the ability within a set of 
rules to alter their own or another’s normative situation.
– (Immunity) An agent B has an immunity if and only if A lacks the ability within 
a set of rules to alter B’s normative situation.
1 From a strictly formal point of view this right should be numbered among civil/political rights, since it is regarded 
by the European Convention on Human Rights (article 11) as a component of the freedom of assembly and associa-
tion. But given its purpose (the protection of workers’ interests) and its history (it appeared as a result of the activity 
of movements aimed at protecting workers’ interests), it can be more plausibly regarded as a social right.
2 This right is often regarded as a cultural right. But the line between social rights and cultural rights is not always 
sharp; the right to free primary education is one of those rights which can plausibly be regarded as belonging to both 
categories: it protects our “cultural interest” in education (so it is a cultural right), but since primary education is 
a necessary condition for realizing our socio-economic interests it can also be viewed as a (at least derivatively) social 
right.
3 Cf. W. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, “Yale Law Journal” 1913/1, 
pp. 16–59.
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Now, drawing on Hohfeld’s distinctions, one can roughly divide Type 1 social rights 
into two categories: 1) liberties and 2) claim-rights.
1) Type 1 social rights may be typical liberties. An example is the right to form and 
join trade unions. As a liberty, it, of course, involves an immunity – from the 
state’s actions aimed at curtailing this liberty. In other words, workers may but 
do not have to associate in trade unions and this right corresponds to an absence 
of power on the part of employers and the state to alter the right-holder’s norma-
tive situation.
2) Most Type 1 social rights are claim-rights in personam, but they are quite pecu-
liar claim-rights compared, e.g., with such “classical” claim-rights as the right of 
private ownership or rights generated by private contracts. The peculiarity com-
mon to all social rights (being claim-rights) is that their addressee (“persona”) is 
usually the state itself, or perhaps, on different interpretation, society acting through 
the medium of the state. An additional peculiarity, typical for some Type 1 social 
rights, is that they are derivative from a duty. For instance, one cannot forgo one’s 
right to basic healthcare by refusing to pay healthcare insurance or the right 
to pension benefits by refusing to pay pension premiums. One can therefore say 
that they are doubly correlated to duties (and not singly correlated to duties the 
way “classical” claim-rights are): their holder has a duty to take some actions 
that give rise to these rights, and the rights are (as all claim-rights are) correlated 
with a duty towards the right-holder. This “double correlation” is characteristic 
for what may be called “paternalistic” rights, i.e., rights granted to the agent as 
a result of the policy of hard paternalism (i.e., paternalism that allows for impos-
ing certain duties on the agent with a view to promoting his or her well-being or 
to preventing his or her well-being from deteriorating). Paternalistic rights arise 
therefore as a result of mandatory contracts (social, health and pension insur-
ance) enforced by the state.
3) Another peculiarity of some Type 1 social rights, e.g. the right to (primary) educa-
tion, is that they are primarily a duty rather than a right (or, simultaneously a duty 
and a right). Paternalistic rights are similar to them in that they are correlated 
with their holder’s duty, but dissimilar in that the duty’s content is different from 
the right’s content.
2.2. Type 2 social rights
Type 2 social rights do not fall under any of the “Hohfeldian incidents”. I shall analyze 
at some length one of these rights – “the right to work”. This right could, in theory, be 
interpreted as a liberty (privilege) or a claim-right, but these interpretations would be 
obviously inconsistent with the way it is understood by its adherents. If this right were 
merely a liberty, it would constitute only a protection for our liberty to choose an oc-
cupation, and thereby a protection against all attempts to impose on us, against our will, 
a given kind of work. It is clear that it is not a claim-right either: the holder of this right 
cannot require that the state grant him or her a job. This right is therefore what Joel 
Feinberg called a “manifesto right”: it is an exhortation directed at the legislator to un-
dertake action aiming at decreasing the rate of unemployment;4 the implementation 
4 J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy, New York 1973, pp. 63–67.
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of this kind of right will always be progressive and imperfect. Other rights of this type 
are, among others, the right to decent standards of living, the right to enjoy the benefits 
of scientific progress, the right to income equality, or the right to housing. Clearly, it 
would be odd to interpret, e.g., the right to housing as endowing the citizen with a claim 
to housing and thereby as imposing on the state the duty to guarantee housing to every 
citizen. But, of course, it would be equally odd to interpret it as imposing on the state 
and citizens the duty of non-interference with one’s search for housing. Its only plausible 
interpretation is that it spells out an exhortation to the state to realize, by various means, 
a housing policy which would enhance the accessibility of housing to all citizens. These 
are therefore aspirational, regulative principles, not imposing any strict duties on the 
legislator that could be enforced by the judiciary.
Two additional points need to be stressed in the context of the discussion of Type 2 
social rights. Firstly, the fact that Type 2 social rights are aspirational in nature rather 
than strict duties need not necessarily be treated as their disadvantage. As was aptly 
remarked by James Nickel:
Treating very demanding rights as goals has several advantages. One is that proposed goals 
that exceed one’s abilities are not as farcical as proposed duties that exceed one’s abilities. 
Creating grand lists of human rights that many countries cannot at present realize seems 
fraudulent to many people, and perhaps this fraudulence is reduced if we understand that 
these “rights” are really goals that countries should promote. Goals are inherently ability-
calibrated. What you should do now about your goals depends on your abilities and other 
commitments. Goals coexist happily with low levels of ability to achieve them. Another ad-
vantage is that goals are flexible; addressees with different levels of ability can choose ways 
of pursuing the goals that suit their circumstances and means. Because of these attractions of 
goals, it will be worth exploring ways to transform very demanding human rights into goals. 
The transformation may be full or partial.5
Secondly, the difference between Type 1 and Type 2 social rights should not be con-
ceived in absolute terms. The first reason for this is that some social rights may “pass” 
from one type to another. This is indeed often the case with the right to housing. In 
many legal systems the scope of the application of this right is narrowed down to the 
least advantaged persons, e.g., those living below the level of subsistence; as a result, 
the right to housing can be reasonably regarded as a claim-right (i.e., as a Type 1 social 
right). One can, of course, also imagine treating the right to work or the right to hous-
ing for everyone as a Type 1 social rights, but in practice, for economic reasons, such 
a construal of these rights is not feasible and therefore would be, to use Nickel’s term, 
“fraudulent”. The second reason is more interesting because it is connected with the 
very structure of these two types of social rights, viz.: it may be possible to, so to speak, 
transform the structure of Type 2 social rights with a view to likening them, to a certain 
extent, to Type 1 social rights. The result of such a transformation could be called, fol-
lowing James Nickel, “right-goal mixtures”. Nickel describes them in the following way:
Since even a goal that is supported by good reasons imposes no duties – that is, fails to be man-
datory in character – we may think that such goals are poor substitutes for rights and should not 
be called “rights”. But it is possible to create right-goal mixtures that contain some mandatory 
elements and that therefore seem more like real rights. A minimal right-goal mixture would 
5 J. Nickel, Human Rights, in: E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014, available online at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/rights-human/.
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include a duty to try to realize the goal as quickly as possible (…). The economic and social rights 
in the Social Covenant [i.e. the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
– W.Z.] seem to fit this model. The countries ratifying the Covenant agree to make it a matter of 
government duty to realize the list of rights as soon as possible. (…) Each of the Social Covenant’s 
signatories has agreed to “take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-
operation to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” (…) A problem with such a right-
goal mixture is that it allows the addressee great discretion concerning when to do something 
about the right and how much to do. A panel supervising compliance with a human rights treaty 
may wish to remove some of this discretion by requiring that the addressees at least take some 
significant and good faith steps immediately and regularly and that these steps be documented 
(…) Goals can be assigned addressees (the party who is to pursue the goal), beneficiaries, scopes 
that define the objective to be pursued, and a high level of priority. Strong reasons for the im-
portance of these goals can be provided. And supervisory bodies can monitor levels of progress 
and pressure low-performing addressees to attend to and work on their goals.6
A similar system of monitoring (based on reports submitted by the states) is provided 
by the European Social Charter. It remains the fact, though, that even after an intro-
duction of various mechanism of monitoring the implementation of social rights by the 
signatory states, the rights are still essentially different from Type 1 social rights. In 
other words, even after such a transformation they are at their core Type 2 social rights.
2.3. Type 1 and Type 2 social rights: (usually) positive rights
Social rights of both types can also be characterized by means of the distinction between 
positive and negative rights. The distinction has been described by Charles Fried in the 
following way:
A positive right is a claim to something – a share of material goods, or some particular good 
like the attention of a lawyer or a doctor or perhaps the claim to a result like health and en-
lightenment – while a negative right is a right that something not be done to one, that some 
particular imposition be withheld. Positive rights are inevitably asserted to scarce goods, and 
consequently scarcity implies a limit to the claim. Negative rights, however, the rights not 
to be interfered with in forbidden ways, do not appear to have such natural, such inevitable 
limitation. (...) It is logically possible to respect any number of negative rights without neces-
sarily landing in an impossible and contradictory situation. (...) Positive rights, by contrast, 
cannot as a logical matter be treated as categorical entities, because of the scarcity limitation.7
As Cécile Fabre rightly notes, Fried’s distinction between positive and negative rights 
embraces in fact two distinctions, viz. the basic one – the duty distinction: “some rights 
are negative in that they ground negative duties only, while other rights are positive in 
that they ground positive duties to help and resources”, and the secondary one (deriva-
tive, according to Freid, from the duty distinction) – the conflict distinction: “since nega-
tive rights ground negative duties of non-interference, they are not assigned to scarce 
goods and therefore do not conflict with one another; by contrast, since positive rights 
ground positive duties to help and resources, they are assigned to scarce goods and 
therefore conflict with one another”.8 Before moving on to characterizing social rights, 
6 J. Nickel, Human…
7 Ch. Fried, Right and Wrong, Cambridge (Mass.)–London 1978, p. 110.
8 C. Fabre, Constitutionalising Social Rights, “The Journal of Political Philosophy” 1998/3, pp. 262–263.
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it should be noted that the second distinction is not fully convincing,9 since one can eas-
ily imagine various instances of conflicts between negative rights, e.g., between the right 
to privacy and the right to free speech, or between the right to free movement and the 
right of assembly. One cannot even say that conflicts between negative rights are less 
frequent than those between positive rights; it is hard to imagine how a calculation of 
the quantity of various types of conflicts between rights could ever be carried out. But 
the first distinction (the duty distinction) is entirely clear – and crucial for distinguish-
ing between negative and positive rights. It is true that this distinction is sometimes 
criticized on the ground that all rights require a certain action on the part of the state 
(e.g., rights traditionally regarded as “negative” – the right to vote, the right to a due 
process of law, or the right to conclude agreements – cannot be realized if certain steps 
are not taken by the state to make possible their implementation), but this objection 
is misleading: in the case of the abovementioned rights the actions of the state do not 
belong to their content, which is why these rights can aptly be called “negative”.
Now, social rights are usually positive, i.e., they are rights to the positive actions of 
the state (and sometimes, as in the case of workers’ rights, to the actions of particular 
individuals – the employers). Even though, as was mentioned before, the sense of the 
state’s duty is different for the two types of social rights. Type 1 social rights ground du-
ties to take certain positive actions, whereas Type 2 social rights ground duties to strive 
to realize certain socially desirable goals. However, social rights can also be negative, 
i.e., they can be rights to other persons’ omissions or forbearances. For instance, the 
right to associate in trade unions is negative, since it is correlated with the negative 
duty of non-interference.10 By contrast, civil and political rights are usually negative 
(they ground a negative duty of non-interference) but they can also be positive (like the 
rights to seek redress through courts, to a due process of law11). In general, one can say 
that social rights are usually positive and civil and political rights are usually negative.
Social rights can of course conflict with one another as well as with civil or political 
rights, e.g. the (social) right to welfare subsidies, which may require increasing taxes, 
can come into conflict with the (civil) right of private ownership. Let me devote a few 
words to the second type of conflicts. Arguably, one cannot decide in abstracto how they 
should be resolved; their resolution requires a thorough analysis of specific conflicts. 
General answers seem unsatisfactory and arbitrary; for instance, one might try to argue, 
in John Rawls’s spirit, that in burdened societies (i.e., poor and undeveloped) priority 
should be given to social rights, whereas in developed societies – to civil and political 
rights. But Rawls’s claim about the “lexical” priority of freedom over well-being is an 
expression of the dubious belief in the possibility of providing a neat hierarchy of various 
social values.12 To support the claim that civil and political rights should have priority 
9 It is also rejected by C. Fabre (C. Fabre, Constitutionalising…, p. 264).
10 It is worth adding that this negative social right is both active (a right to act or not act in a certain way) and passive 
(a right not to be done by others in a certain way). It should be noted that the distinction between active and pas-
sive rights concerns only negative rights; positive rights are neither passive or active. Accordingly, e.g., the social 
right to social security (implying certain transfers of goods from the state) is neither active nor passive, but the right 
to bodily security (e.g., freedom from assault, from arbitrary seizure) is a negative, passive right. More on passive 
and active rights can be found in J. Feinberg, Social…, pp. 59–63.
11 Cf. C. Fabre, Constitutionalising…, p. 269.
12 I have developed this critique in my article Remarks on the Lexical Order of Rawls’s Two Principles of Justice. W. Załuski, 
Remarks on the Lexical Order of Rawls’s Two Principles of Justice, in: A. Brożek, J. Jadacki, B. Žarnić (eds.), Logic, 
Methodology and Philosophy of Science at Warsaw University. Theory of Imperatives from Different Points of View, 
Warszawa 2013, pp. 158–166.
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over social rights, an argument is sometimes put forward that social rights are stressed 
especially by authoritarian regimes. But this argument is altogether implausible: it can 
be easily neutralized by pointing out that social economic crises are likely to lead to the 
curtailments of civil and political liberties (e.g., in the 1930s).
3. Philosophical justification of social rights
One plausible conception of the justification of social rights appeals to the concept of 
fundamental interests and to the principle of subsidiarity. In this conception, a social 
right is justified if it can be shown, first, that it realizes our fundamental interests, and, 
second, that the realization of these fundamental interests cannot be achieved in a dif-
ferent way (e.g., through the common efforts of the local community to which a “person 
in need” belongs) than by protecting them as a “right” directed towards the state. As 
for the first condition, arguably the strongest philosophical justification for social rights 
appeals to the fundamental interest in possessing autonomy, i.e., the capacity to rationally 
form, choose and revise the conception of the good life.13 As Fabre wrote: “If we are 
hungry, thirsty, cold, ill and illiterate, if we constantly live under the threat of poverty, 
we cannot decide on a meaningful conception of the good life, we cannot make long-
term plans, in short we have very little control over our existence.”14 It is worth noting 
that there seems to be an interesting difference between social rights on one hand, and 
civil and political rights on the other as far as their relation to autonomy is concerned. 
Arguably, social rights seem to protect autonomy itself (the capacity to rationally make 
choices between various options might not develop properly if the agent lacks educa-
tion and material resources), while civil and political rights seem to protect the practical 
import of autonomy. If we had only a narrow sphere of negative and political liberty (i.e., 
two types of liberties defended, respectively, by civil and political rights), our autonomy 
(positive freedom) would not have many occasions to “externalize” – there would be 
few options among which we could autonomously choose. The second condition of 
justification appeals to the subsidiarity principle according to which social rights can be 
introduced only as a last resort, i.e., if the fundamental interests cannot be protected 
in some other way. It remains a moot question which of the standard social rights fulfil 
these two conditions. Some Type 1 social rights (e.g., workers’ rights, the right to primary 
education,15 or the right to basic subsistence in the case of illness and disability) and 
some Type 2 social rights (e.g., the right to work) satisfy both conditions of justification 
(thus, one cannot say, generally, that the philosophical justification for a given type 
of social rights is stronger than for the other). But not all social rights seem to satisfy 
these conditions. One may argue that, e.g., the right to pension benefits does not pro-
tect our fundamental interests and/or their goal could be achieved in some other way. 
Furthermore, “paternalistic social rights” are harder to justify than the non-paternalistic 
13 This type of justification was developed by Alan Gewirth (A. Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Ap-
plications, Chicago 1982) and James Griffin (J. Griffin, On Human Rights, Oxford 2008). Gewirth argued that freedom 
and well-being (and the rights protecting them – respectively, civil/political and social) are necessary for realizing 
human agency (i.e. autonomy). In a similar vein, Griffin defended the claim that rights protect our “autonomy”, 
“personhood”, “normative agency”, i.e., the ability to form, revise and pursue a conception of worthwhile life.
14 C. Fabre, Constitutionalising…, p. 267.
15 As was noted by Avi Ben-Bassat, and Momi Dahan, “the right to education is the most widespread social right and 
displays the strongest constitutional commitment”. A. Ben-Bassat, M. Dahan, Social Rights in the Constitution and 
in Practice, “Journal of Comparative Economics” 2008/1, p. 118.
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ones: their justification must be preceded by a notoriously difficult justification of hard 
paternalism. It needs to be added that there are many other conceptions of the justifica-
tion of social rights than the one relying on the principles of autonomy and subsidiarity. 
One may, for instance, argue that social rights protect equality (of wealth or welfare), 
whereas civil and political rights protect liberty. Or, one can argue that social rights are 
expressive of the value of solidarity. One may also maintain that social rights are neces-
sary for taking advantage of civil and political rights (which means that social rights can 
be justified by means of civil and political rights).
Analogously to the justification, the force of the critique of social rights will vary 
depending on which particular social rights are considered. The arguments most fre-
quently raised against social rights are that:16 1) they have a negative impact on eco-
nomic efficiency; 2) they are too burdensome for taxpayers and, in consequence, un-
dermine their motivation for entrepreneurship; 3) they lead to the overgrowth of the 
state and bureaucracy (since social rights are realized by the state);17 4) they promote 
the attitude of passivity and laziness; 5) they do not defend really fundamental interests 
(and thereby do not have a sufficient “moral weight”); 6) some are unjust, violating 
the fair-play principle (e.g., a  lazy person receiving unemployment benefits may be 
regarded as a free rider, who wants to take advantage of the “welfare pool” created 
by the society, even though his or her contribution to this pool is very small or zero); 
7) they are destructive to social solidarity since they undermine informal social mecha-
nisms based on the altruistic motivation of mutual help; 8) they are costly. Some of 
these arguments may indeed be apt with respect to some social rights. For instance, the 
right to unemployment benefit is really likely to promote the attitude of passivity and 
laziness. Furthermore, a number of social rights may indeed have a negative impact on 
economic efficiency and lead to the overgrowth of bureaucracy. But the fact that some 
of these arguments may be valid does not imply that they cannot be defeated by even 
stronger arguments in favour of these rights. As was argued earlier, some of these rights 
can be plausibly viewed as realizing our fundamental interests (which means that the 
objection 5) is flawed with respect to them), and this consideration seems to defeat the 
arguments appealing to economic efficiency or to the overgrowth of bureaucracy. But, 
as was mentioned earlier, before deciding to protect a given interest as a “social right”, 
one should reflect on whether this interest could not be realized in some other way. 
The objections 4) and 6) raised against social rights could be weakened by transform-
ing those social rights which are targeted by these objections into conditional social 
rights, i.e., such rights whose enjoyment is contingent upon some previous activity of 
their holder.18 Thus, for instance, the enjoyment of the right to unemployment benefits 
could be conditioned by the previous activity of the unemployed person – e.g., his or her 
activity aimed at finding a job, or consisting in doing some pro bono work (such activity, 
in addition to satisfying the social sense of fair play, would probably boost the unem-
ployed persons’ sense of self-respect). Arguably, few social rights can be transformed 
16 Cf., e.g., D. Kelley, A Life of One’s Own: Individual Rights and the Welfare State, Washington 1988; W.A. Niskanen, 
Welfare and the Culture of Poverty, “Cato Journal” 1996/1, pp. 45–71; R.A. Sirico, Restoring Charity: Ethical Principles 
for a New Welfare Policy, in: J.J. Sikkenga (ed.), Transforming Welfare. The Revival of American Charity, New York 
1997, p. 34–56.
17 The problem of the justifiability of social rights is connected with the question about the desirable extent of the state’s 
prerogatives. The adherents of the welfare state will be in favour of a broad set of social rights, while the adherents 
of the night-watchman state will want to reduce this set to minimum.
18 Cf. W. Osiatyński, Prawa człowieka i ich granice [Eng. Human Rights and Their Limits], Kraków 2011, pp. 214–217.
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into conditional social rights; it is not easy to provide many more examples apart from 
the right to unemployment benefits (such an example could be perhaps welfare benefits 
for people with mild physical disability – benefits for the severely physically disabled 
should of course be unconditional). This understanding of the term “conditional social 
rights” should be distinguished from the understanding connected with the “double 
correlation” character of some of them. As mentioned in section 2.2, some of the social 
rights are in fact not “free-standing” rights, but arise out of a duty (e.g., to pay insurance 
premiums) binding upon their holder. One can therefore say that they are conditional 
on this duty.
At the end of this paper, I would like to note that the problem of the justifiability of 
social rights can also be discussed in a broader – philosophical-anthropological – con-
text. This context is connected with two questions: the question of the responsibility 
of human beings for the course of their life (and therefore the question of the role of 
luck in our life), and the question of human rationality. The assumption that the role 
of luck in shaping our lives is substantial and/or that human beings are only boundedly 
rational provides a strong case for social rights. The assumption (made within classical 
liberalism) that the role of luck in shaping our lives is marginal and that humans are 
rational provides a strong case against social rights. A development of these issues, 
however, lies beyond the scope of this paper.
